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Abstract 
Mental simulation -- such as imagining tilting a glass to figure out the angle at which water would 
spill-- can be a way of coming to know the answer to an internally or externally posed query. Is 
this form of learning a species of inference or a form of observation? We argue that it is neither: 
learning through simulation is a genuinely distinct form of learning.  On our account, simulation 
can support learning the answer to a query even when the basis for that answer is opaque to the 
learner. Moreover, through repeated simulation, the learner can reduce this opacity, supporting 
self-training and the acquisition of more accurate models of the world. Simulation is thus an 
essential part of the story of how creatures like us become effective learners and knowers 
Introduction 
Imagine that you have two cylindrical glasses of the same height, where one is wide and one is 
thin. Each glass is filled with water to the same height. If you slowly tip both glasses over at the 
same rate, which glass will spill water first? Or, will they both spill water when tipped to the very 
same angle? 
This challenge – known as the “water-pouring problem” (Schwartz & Black, 1999) – is often 
answered incorrectly. But if people are invited to imagine holding out their hands (as if holding 
both glasses), to close their eyes, and to mentally rotate their hands until they think the water would 
spill, they often produce the correct response: that water from the wide glass will spill first. Call 
this activity of answering a query by imagining and then evaluating the output of one’s imagination 
mental simulation.  
The exercise of simulation just described looks like a way of learning something new. Construed 
in this way, it is a lot like learning through observation. But it’s also natural to say that this kind 
of learning doesn’t rely on acquiring any new information. Described like this, it is a lot like 
learning through inference. 
How does learning through simulation support learning? And what, if anything, is epistemically 
distinctive about learning through simulation? Can learning through simulation be reduced to 
learning through observation or through inference?  
This paper aims to make progress on these questions. We argue that mental simulation cannot be 
reduced to observation or inference, though it shares important similarities with both. On our 
account, mental simulation is distinctive in two ways. First, simulation is a method that can support 
learning some proposition q (the output of the simulation) even when the basis for that output is 
opaque to the learner. Second, through repeated simulation, the learner can reduce this opacity, 
supporting the acquisition of more accurate models of the world. This allows us to see why (and 
under what conditions) simulation is an essential part of learning from what we already know.  
Our account is partially motivated by new developments in machine learning and artificial 
intelligence that make the topic of simulation timely. Some of today’s most successful artificial 
agents (most famously the deep learning architecture AlphaGo, Silver et al., 2016) learn through 
simulation, training themselves over and over on simulated outcomes. Within reinforcement 
learning, comparing model-based and model-free systems has opened an avenue of research into 
the power and limits of an internal model (e.g., Atkeson & Santamaria, 1997; Hamrick, 2019). 
And even the most basic unsupervised clustering methods have challenged our assumptions about 
how much can be learned through a process which, like many simulations, is opaque to the person 
relying on it, and devoid of explicit knowledge. 
These examples complement more familiar examples of mental simulation that have been the 
subject of prolonged interest and debate in both psychology and philosophy, with important work 
on the role of imagination (e.g., Kind & Kung (Ed.), 2016) and thought experiments (e.g., Brown 
& Fehige, 2017). As we use the term, however, simulation is a more expansive category than 
thought experiments: it includes cases of repeated (“long-run”) simulation, as in fine-tuning 
athletic skills through motor imagery, as well as artificial simulations. Theorizing about this larger 
category brings into focus features of learning through simulation that have been under-
emphasized in past work on the epistemic role of simulation in the mind and in science, in 
particular the long-run use of simulation and the connections between one-shot and long-run 
simulation.1  
Of course, drawing such a wide net also has disadvantages. Why think this heterogenous category 
will have anything interesting in common? One reason to suspect there is an epistemic feature 
shared by most simulations is the similarity of the philosophical debates surrounding their use. 
                                               
1 A side-effect of this wider focus is that our account does not differentiate between simulations 
that are conscious or unconscious, internal or external, or propositional or non-propositional. 
While these are interesting differences, we aim to establish a similarity in the epistemic function 
of the process across these dichotomies. 
Shannon Spaulding (2016) argues that mindreading2 (simulating the thoughts of others) cannot be 
a way to learn new things about the world, but is a way of generating ideas to assist other cognitive 
faculties that are capable of producing knowledge through inference (or observation). Tamar 
Gendler (2004) advances the view that thought experiments are often “quasi-observational,” such 
that accompanying visual imagery plays a critical epistemic role. Discussing computer simulation 
in physics, Eran Tal (2009) asserts that simulation can confirm hypotheses, but not by inferring 
from data to theory - instead, the simulations he discusses offer a way of inferring from theory to 
data. In each case, we see a remarkably similar dialectic, attempting to fit simulation into some 
epistemic role relative to inference and observation.  
A second reason to draw a wide net in efforts to capture the epistemic role of simulation comes 
from the success of related projects: philosophers already take inference and observation to be 
categories that cover both individual cognitive exercises and public scientific acts – and so it seems 
apt to ask a similar question about simulation at the same level of generality. However, in order to 
keep our argument focused, we will build a theory of mental simulation around evidence from a 
single domain, motor simulation, and then argue that the account generalizes to scientific and 
artificial contexts. 
By making progress in understanding the function of simulation, we’ll also shed light on the 
function of the capacity to simulate. Why would this capacity be useful in the first place? 
Simulation is a fairly common mental activity, at least in humans, and yet it’s not obvious that if 
a designer were to create a learning machine to solve the kinds of problems we solve, she would 
give the machine the capacity to simulate. Our account sheds light on why we are the kinds of 
learners that benefit from simulation.  
We start in Section 1 with a case from machine learning that presents a functional role for 
simulation – self-training – that a successful account should capture. In Section 2, we’ll clarify our 
assumptions and terminology concerning simulation, observation, and inference as ways of 
acquiring knowledge. Sections 3 and 4 explore ways in which simulation might be related to 
observation and inference. We conclude that while simulation has something in common with each, 
it cannot be reduced to a version of either. Sections 5-7 present our positive account: we explain 
what simulation lacks (Section 5), what it offers (Section 6), and how it works (Section 7), 
introducing the important idea of representational extraction. We conclude in Section 8 by 
discussing the ramifications of our proposal.  
1. An Epistemic Function of Simulation: Self-training 
In this section, we’ll run through one example of a machine learning process that trains its own 
internal model through a kind of simulation. This case is not meant to be particularly unique, but 
rather an exemplar of a general feature that helps explain the success of this class of learning 
methods – and raises questions about how humans and other animals might build and use internal 
                                               
2 A long and complex debate exists over whether theory of mind (or mindreading) is a simulation, 
an inference, or involves both. We’ll avoid taking a position in this debate, and we don’t intend 
the discussion of inference here to necessarily track the sense of inference invoked in the “theory-
theory” (e.g., Sellars, 1956).  
models. 
Our example is a model-based reinforcement learning method called “Hallucinated Replay” 
(Talvitie, 2014). In contrast to more standard reinforcement learning algorithms (such as Q-
learning; Sutton & Barto, 1998), Hallucinated Replay uses two kinds of feedback to learn. The 
first kind of feedback is ordinary, external feedback: the model is updated when actual 
observations fail to conform to predictions. The second kind of feedback involves “hallucinated” 
rather than actual observations: if a predicted state (e.g., that was expected to lead to some reward) 
is not observed, the model will update expectations with respect to the predicted state as well as 
the actual state, even though the former was not actually observed.3 Interestingly, the predicted 
(“hallucinated”) states need not be possible states of the environment, so they would never be 
observed and subsequently updated using more standard forms of training. The hallucinated 
training, on the other hand, essentially trains the model to get back on track from these fictional 
states. This algorithm is thus training itself to predict well, even when it predicts based on incorrect 
imagined “feedback.”  
Hallucinated Replay is not globally superior to other model-based reinforcement learning 
algorithms. However, it has been shown empirically and analytically to succeed in contexts where 
comparable methods, trained on the same data (but without “hallucination”), tend to struggle 
(Talvitie, 2017, 2018). In particular, the model does better in environments that require agents to 
correct their model structure rather than merely tune parameters. Hallucinated Replay seems to 
help with this process because the model trains itself to self-correct from a wide range of inaccurate 
states, including those that would never be produced by the actual environment.  
This example reflects a ubiquitous feature of machine learning algorithms: to succeed, they must 
be able to train themselves, and this training cannot depend on a representation of the reward 
structure of the environment that is already accurate.4 In developing our own account of learning 
through simulation, we draw a key lesson: that simulation is an exercise performed using an 
internal model that also trains and alters that model. We refer to this feature as self-training, and 
a motivating consideration for our account of learning through simulation is that it accommodate 
this form of learning alongside more familiar cases of learning from isolated episodes of simulation, 
such as the water-pouring problem and most scientific thought experiments.  
2. Clarifications 
Before moving on to consider learning through observation and through inference, it’s worth 
                                               
3 As a quick illustration, imagine the agent starts in state S0, and predicts initially that act A1 in S0 
will bring about S1, and then act A2 in S1 will bring about Sr, a rewarding state. However, the agent 
is wrong: act A1 in S0 brings about S1*, and act A2 in S1* brings about Sr*. A standard update would 
train the model at S0 against the actual observed transition to S1*, generate a prediction for the acts 
available at S1*, and then evaluate that prediction against the next observation. In this way, only 
predictions from actual states get updated. Hallucinated Replay adds a second update, where taking 
A1 in the “hallucinated” state S1 is corrected as if it should have resulted in Sr* rather than the 
predicted Sr. 
4 See Hamrick (2019) for a review of simulation in reinforcement learning algorithms.  
introducing some clarifications of our aims and terminology. 
First, note that our aim is to put forward a new theory of an epistemic function of simulation, not 
to identify the only function of simulation. A further qualification is that while capturing this 
distinctive function of simulation will bring into focus differences between simulation and 
paradigmatic cases of observation and inference, there are other ways of inferring and observing 
that are more similar to, and perhaps intertwined with, simulation. Our reason for focusing on 
paradigmatic cases of observation and inference is that we have a good grasp on how such cases 
generate knowledge (even if the details are controversial). Assimilating simulation to observation 
or inference is thus attractive as a solution to the puzzle of how simulation can be a way to generate 
knowledge. Rather than drawing a bright line between simulation on the one hand, and observation 
and inference on the other, however, we instead hope that our final account will illuminate 
important similarities, and provide a foundation for future work that takes seriously the elements 
of simulation and imagination that are embedded in perception, induction, prediction, and other 
ways of observing or inferring.  
We will compare three kinds of learning processes, defined as ways of coming to know the answer 
to an internally or externally posed query. These processes are learning through simulation, 
learning through observation, and learning through inference. We’ll describe each process in terms 
of its inputs and output. The former could include inputs from the external world, from the 
thinker’s internal representations, or some combination thereof. These inputs are utilized by some 
kind of cognitive process to yield the output: a piece of knowledge, knowledge that q, which we 
denote K(q). Note that the sense of learning we are invoking here is factive: learning that q entails 
that q. We also assume that knowledge requires more than true belief, but the way that this 
additional commitment is spelled out will not matter for our story.5 
To illustrate these processes in action, consider again the water-pouring problem. We assume that 
holding out your hands to simulate pouring, or creating a vivid mental image of so doing, constitute 
simulation. However, you could have solved this problem a different way: by finding two glasses 
fitting the description, filling them with water to the same level, and then rotating them to see 
which spills first. In this case, you did not simulate to arrive at an answer, but instead set up an 
experiment and then learned the result through observation.   
Likewise, when presented with the water-pouring problem, you might have solved the problem 
using static images, like those in Figure 1, and an argument along the following lines. 
                                               
5 We’ll discuss learning in terms of coming to know a proposition, but it’s worth noting that on 
many accounts, there are separate and non-reducible ways of coming to know a skill or coming to 
know an object (in the sense of acquaintance). We suspect our arguments hold equally well for 
these other kinds of knowledge, but fleshing out how this would work is outside the scope of the 
present paper.  
 Figure 1. A representation of the water-pouring problem. 
Say that the wide glass is just as tall as it is wide, and both glasses are filled up to exactly halfway. 
In that case, the liquid will spill out of the wide glass as soon as it is turned past a 45-degree angle, 
since the diagonal line from the top left to the bottom right of the glass divides it by volume into 
two equal halves, just like the original horizontal line. On the other hand, the thin glass, when 
divided by the same diagonal line, will have to be tipped much farther to keep the diagonal line 
parallel to the horizontal. This explanation shows the same result as the motor simulation, and even 
uses a visual device in the form of a figure, but intuitively it is not a simulation. As just described, 
this process of figuring out the answer is instead a kind of learning through inference.  
With these paradigmatic cases of simulation, observations, and inference as reference points, we 
can move on to our arguments. 
3. Simulation as Learning through Observation 
One way to make sense of learning through simulation is to assimilate it to learning through 
observation. In this section, we first develop this picture, and then argue that it is inadequate.  
We can start with a rough definition of learning through observation as a transition from the 
representation of some external piece of new evidence e to a conclusion q. S's learning q from 
evidence e realizes a relation of external evidential support, such that e renders q true or likely to 
be true. In the terminology introduced in the previous section, this means that the input to learning 
includes new evidence, and that the cognitive process realizes the relation of external evidential 
support. This external evidential support relation is necessary to explain why being exposed to an 
apple, but forming a subjectively justified internal representation as of an orange, does not count 
as an observation. Whatever else one might require of learning from observation, it should be 
relatively uncontroversial that what it means to observe requires that the target of observation stand 
in some sort of external evidential relation to the internal representation it produces.  
Simulation has at least a superficial similarity to observation. In our examples, the thinker sets up 
some conditions and then “observes” the outcome of her simulation. Pursuing this parallel, we can 
see both observation and simulation as answering the same query (e.g., “which cup will spill 
first?”), and as doing so in much the same way: through a transition from some (actual or simulated) 
observation e to some conclusion q. 
In fact, some form of equivalence between actual and simulated observations is advocated or 
presupposed in empirical research on learning from simulated experience. As one example, 
Kappes and Morewedge (2016) argue that simulated experience can sometimes “substitute” for 
the corresponding real experience, because “mentally simulating an experience induces equivalent 
downstream psychological and behavioral effects as actually having the corresponding experience” 
(pp. 406-407).  They review evidence from a range of cases, including the mental simulation of 
hypothetical observations, sequential procedures, or desired outcomes. 
Another example comes from the literature on motor imagery, where the dominant paradigm is 
what is called the “functional equivalence” model, originally expressed as the idea that  “imagery 
of movements has some functional effects on motor behaviour that are in some way equivalent to 
actual movements” (Johnson 1982, pp. 363). Jeannerod suggests that “it seems a logical 
consequence of this rehearsal of the corresponding brain structures, and specifically the motor 
structures, that the subsequent execution will be facilitated” (pp. 108). Of course, advocates of 
functional equivalence do not consider actual motor experience and motor simulation completely 
equivalent: for instance, motor training might help stretch out muscles, but surely motor simulation 
does not have that function. Rather, this equivalence is restricted to a subset of the functions of 
each activity, where this subset is taken to explain how motor simulation supports learning. 
In contrast to this thesis, we’ll argue that assimilating the functional role of simulation to that of 
observation misses one of the most important ways in which simulation supports learning. Like 
the two forms of feedback in Hallucinated Replay, actual and simulated observations play different 
functional roles when it comes to self-training, and understanding the role of simulation in self-
training is crucial for understanding (e.g.) how motor simulation supports learning.  
To see why observation and simulation come apart when it comes to their functional roles, it’s 
useful to consider two time-points at which we might engage in simulation: at the beginning of 
learning (when the simulation mechanism is not yet trained), or at the end of learning (when the 
simulation mechanism is fully trained). Of course, real cases will almost always fall within these 
time-points; for our purposes, these idealized points are merely relative benchmarks. 
To illustrate, consider a simulation of a golf swing and an actual exercise of a golf swing, which 
both have as their output a state with the content that the ball misses the target by a few inches to 
the right. A functional equivalence theorist might be tempted to say that each of these processes 
yields an “observation,” and that these observations serve the same function. And in some sense 
this is right: both events could have the same immediate impact on the motor system, and both 
serve the function of allowing the  simulator to generate a response to the question of where the 
ball will go. Yet the simulated swing in fact generates something distinct from actual observation: 
it generates (likely noisy) information about where the ball would go on the  simulator’s current 
motor model.6 This point becomes important when we consider the beginning of learning – before 
                                               
6 In fact, even in the one shot case we can observe what look like systematic differences between 
an imagined motion and an actual motor execution; Walsh and Rosenbaum (2009) find that 
imagined motions and actual motions conform to different aims: for instance, in imagining a line 
connecting to an ellipse we tend to prefer connecting the line to the apex, whereas when drawing, 
we tend to prefer a shorter path. 
the model is fully trained. 
Consider a case where your motor model is biased to the left: you tend to predict that balls you hit 
will land farther to the left than they actually do, were you to replicate the imagined swing in 
practice. In this case, the actual swing gives you a baseline against which to judge your simulated 
swing: when they have different results, especially in this systematic way, you should start to ask 
yourself where this difference is coming from and conclude that you are not taking into account 
some critical factor in your imagination. The combined use of the motor exercise and motor 
simulation allows you to solve a problem: you can now adjust the motor model for better prediction 
in the future. But the reason why the two swings can work together in this case is that each serves 
a different function – neither two motor exercises nor two motor simulations could enable you to 
correct your model in the way described above. Actual swings are the most direct way to learn 
what’s off about your simulation, and simulated swings are the most direct way to learn what your 
current knowledge base and motor model predict.  
Thus, focusing on the beginning of learning illustrates why the functional equivalence claim breaks 
down. If the two processes were truly equivalent for training, then at a process level, observation 
and simulation would “calibrate” or self-train the model in just the same way. But the lesson from 
such cases is more general: even for highly trained experts, relying on the model and relying on 
feedback from the environment to learn a single output may have different costs and be reliable 
under different conditions, insofar as even perfect experts will still need to calibrate and tune when 
they face changes in their environments or in their own capacities. Indeed, people’s use of 
simulation is sensitive to these functional differences (for one example, see Dasgupta et al., 2018).   
Before moving on, consider another way of assimilating learning through simulating to learning 
through observation: the position that simulation is a kind of learning through observation, but one 
that answers a different query and has a distinct target of observation. Whereas learning through 
observation answers queries about the external world, learning through simulation answers 
questions about our internal models. Correspondingly, the target of the former is the external 
world, while the target of the latter is ourselves. 7  On its own, this move is insufficient to 
accomplish our original goal: to explain how mental simulation can be used to learn about the 
world. In the water-pouring problem, the query answered through simulation was which glass 
would in fact spill first, not something about a mental model. But the view that simulation answers 
queries about our mental models could be supplemented to include an additional step: something 
like an inference connecting the internal observation to a proposition about the external world. For 
instance, in the water-pouring case, one would first observe that one’s motor model “expects” the 
wider glass to spill first, and then infer based on the reliability of this model that the wider glass 
                                               
7 Magdalena Balcerak Jackson offers a version of a view on which simulation offers observations 
of the internal world, as opposed to the external world. On her account, the similarity in structure 
between imagining and perception explains why imaginings can give us phenomenal evidence 
(evidence about how things look). Observation (or in her terms, perception) has the role of 
providing phenomenal evidence as well as what she calls physical evidence (evidence about the 
way things are). Of these two roles, simulation can play the former, but not the latter.  Other views 
similarly suggest that imagination can be a similar process to perception, but directed towards 
different subject matters. For example, Williamson (2016) takes the line that imagination gives us 
access to modal facts. 
would in actuality spill first. In other words, learning through simulation could be reduced to a 
form of learning through observation (of one’s internal model) followed by an instance of learning 
through inference (in which this internal observation figures in an inference about the external 
world). 
We think this approach is problematic for several reasons. First, recall that we characterized 
learning through observation as a transition involving a relationship of external evidential support. 
This relationship would need to be modified to account for how one part of the mind could stand 
in the right (external?) relationship to another for this relationship (or a close analog) to obtain. 
The idea that one part of the mind performs a simulation, while another observes it, is 
uncomfortably homunculur, but perhaps not fatal. Our second worry involves the subsequent 
inferential step. An inference from an internal model to the external world would require (perhaps 
implicit) knowledge of what justifies the model’s output. While some commitment concerning the 
relationship between the model and the world may often ground uses of simulation in science (see, 
e.g., Weisberg, 2012 on the role of models in science), it seems too demanding to require this of 
most mental simulation. As we elaborate below, it is characteristic of learning through simulation 
that we lack access to such commitments.  
A final worry about this strategy is that it breaks up what looks like a single process into a series 
of fully distinct and epistemically independent steps. Doing so leaves us with the problem of 
explaining why these steps would be taken in sequence, and what relates them to each other. In 
sum, the strategy of reducing simulation to an internal observation followed by an inference seems 
to stretch our understanding of both observation and inference, and to miss what’s epistemically 
distinctive about learning through simulation. 
4. Simulation as Learning through Inference 
An alternative way to approach simulation is to treat it as a form of learning through inference. By 
inference, we’ll cast a wide net to include deductive and inductive reasoning, as well as abductive 
inference.8  Crucially, inference here picks out a cognitive act rather than a relation between 
propositions, following Harman’s (1986) distinction between inference and implication. As with 
the reduction to observation, this reduction would explain how simulation can result in learning 
by appealing to learning mechanisms that are better understood.  
The project of reducing simulation to inference has several appealing features. First, like inference, 
simulation seems to rely on no external input; inference is the canonical form of learning from 
what you already know. A second promising element is that inference has a well-defined formal 
structure. Intuitively, what is distinctive about inference is that it involves the sort of process we 
can write down in the form of premises and a conclusion. If there were a parallel structure of 
premises and conclusion hidden in cases of simulation, this would be tremendously explanatory of 
the conditions for success and failure when it comes to learning through simulation.9  
                                               
8 On some views, abduction includes induction, and on others the reverse may be true.  
9 Norton (1991) argues along similar lines that thought experiments have a hidden argumentative 
structure, and so count as arguments for epistemic purposes. Gendler (1998) rejects the latter, 
instead holding that the supposed hidden argumentative structure does not capture the epistemic 
Let’s start with a definition of inference. While this is of course the subject of much dispute, most 
definitions share two linked components: (i) a requirement about the causal relationship between 
the thinker entertaining the premises and her entertaining the conclusion, and (ii) a requirement 
about awareness (or some weaker kind of reasons-responsiveness) that explains how the thinker 
could be described as endorsing the connection between premises and conclusions. Paul 
Boghossian’s definition of inference illustrates both components: 
A transition from some beliefs to a conclusion counts as inference only if the thinker takes 
his conclusion to be supported by the presumed truth of those other beliefs.......S’s inferring 
from p to q is for S to judge q because S takes the (presumed) truth of p to  provide 
support for q. (Boghossian, 2014) 
We’re also interested in cases with more than one premise, and so we’ll expand the definition to 
allow for a set of premises p1….pn that jointly support the conclusion.  
This notion of inference (as Boghossian himself notes) is too restrictive if we assume that the 
relevant sense of “taking the truth of p to provide support for q” requires explicit endorsement of 
a proposition about warrant. In an everyday context, the thinker usually tracks the support relation 
in a less explicit way. For instance, she might be said to implicitly infer on some basis when her 
use of inference is counterfactually responsive to that basis. That is, if her evidence had suggested 
that the basis did not hold, she would not have been disposed to make the inference (or, in other 
cases, if her evidence had implied that the basis holds, she would still have been disposed to make 
the inference).   
Could a rat, on this implicit theory, count as inferring the location of a food source from an 
inductive generalization about past food locations? Since our aim is to pick out differences 
between simulation and inference across many kinds of thinkers, we’ll adopt a permissive notion 
of inference that includes (non-human) animal thought. However, this definition will not capture 
everything that is sometimes called inference. Critically, we require the thinker to in some sense 
be in touch with the relationship between premises and conclusion, satisfying a weak form of 
condition (ii). 
Suppose our rat’s judgment that the food is on the left is caused by past experience of food being 
on the left when a particular odor is presented at the start of the maze. In a case of inference, he 
represents these experiences, and these representations cause his subsequent judgment (satisfying 
condition i). However, we require something more. While our rat can neither report the basis of 
his judgment nor his endorsement of some support relation between this basis and a conclusion, 
he can act as if the implicit form of condition (ii) holds: for instance, he might put two kinds of 
similar experience together to infer a generalization, such as “odors are only correlated with food 
position when they are presented at a particular time.”  
What would it mean to act as if he wasn’t making a genuine inference? In this case, he might 
persist in turning to the left even when the context shifts, or fail to learn (or be responsive to) 
generalizations about his environment. Generalization and other forms of meta-learning are an 
                                               
function of a thought experiment. See also Lombrozo (forthcoming) for further discussion of the 
limitations of reduction.  
indication of inference because in order for this “learning to learn” (Harlow, 1949; Behrens et al. 
2018) to occur, the rodent needs to do more than just be caused to go left based on some facts. 
What he needs is a sensitivity to the basing relation itself, which is to say he needs to infer.10  This 
point is not merely theoretical; as one example, Tibbetts et al. (2019) present evidence that wasps 
make transitive inferences – i.e., they put past regularities together to learn a new one, which is 
exactly the kind of behavior that indicates true inference. 
By defining inference in this way, we have a notion that’s weak enough to capture implicit cases, 
but strong enough to identify why inference is a distinctive way of coming to know. Awareness of 
some particular propositions as the basis of one’s belief (even if only in our very weak sense) 
explains why inference works: it’s the kind of transition that builds on past knowledge in an 
accessible (and hence generalizable) way. We scrutinize inferential transitions, feel uneasy about 
those that proceed from a shaky basis, and evaluate how they fit together. Inference, unlike 
observation, makes salient a particular set of background beliefs (i.e., the basis) and their 
connection to the newly learned proposition. 
Now, consider the difference between the original simulation of the two glasses in the water-
pouring problem and the more explicit reasoning provided in Figure 1. The argument associated 
with the figure could be re-written as a set of numbered premises, and it seems natural that the 
person who uses this reasoning to discover the conclusion judges that the wide glass will spill first 
because she takes the truth of these premises to provide support for that conclusion.  
On the other hand, something is missing in the simulation case. A thinker who uses simulation to 
answer the question is likely to find herself in the following position: she knows that her motor 
system in some sense “thinks” that the wide glass will spill first under the simulated conditions. 
However, she is unable to identify, recognize, or in any way point to what it is about these 
conditions, or indeed about her cognitive system, that generates the conclusion. She reached the 
conclusion because of something represented in her perceptual or motor system, and this causal 
relationship meets the first requirement (i) for inference. However, she cannot judge that the 
connection between premises and conclusion was one of support, because she is not in a position 
to identify the premises. She therefore fails to meet the second requirement (ii) for inference.   
The issue here is not that the motor system is a holistic set of connected premises that support the 
conclusion - if so, this argument would also suggest that any kind of holistic inference is not real 
inference. Instead, the issue is that there are particular things about the inputs and cognitive 
processes behind this reasoning that support the conclusion, and lots of things about the inputs and 
cognitive processes that have nothing to do with the conclusion. But our simulator is unable to tell 
the difference, and thus to recognize or internally evaluate the relationship of support. To make 
this point even more obvious, consider that it might even be unclear to the simulator whether the 
answer came from her motor system, pure visual imagination, some form of spatial reasoning, or 
                                               
10 Siegel (2019) adopts an even weaker view of inference, on which it’s the force of the conclusion 
that individuates inference from association or what she calls “mental jogging.” We don’t wish to 
rule out her theory as capturing the nature of inference as a cognitive kind. However, as we’ve 
defined it, inference is distinct from other kinds of learning, such as observation. On Siegel’s view, 
perception itself is a form of inference, and so no such separation is possible. And so for the 
purposes of a taxonomy of coming-to-know, a more restrictive view of inference is required.   
a combination of the above.11 The critical point is that even if we assume that our thinker did not 
know whether her simulated output was coming from the visual system or required motor 
imagination, this does not undermine the fact that she learned the answer through simulation.  
In fact, our simulator plausibly knows that she lacks the ability to identify the premises, and we 
can imagine that this bothers her. To rectify this, she might re-do the simulation, trying out what 
happens if the glasses are imagined to be very different in size, or if they are filled very high or 
very low. This re-simulation is a way to pull out the knowledge she lacks of what it is about the 
setup that matters to the output. 
Our simulator’s lack of knowledge might be seen as a flaw in simulation. And the inference-
reductionist might use this to argue that simulation is instead a defective kind of inference. But 
this response misses something interesting about the process of re-simulation. The example above 
actually shows more than just a lack of knowledge in the case of simulation that is present in the 
case of inference. The further element is that re-simulation can help address this lack of knowledge.  
This feature implies that simulation and inference have different roles. After all, if inference 
requires identification of the premises, it cannot serve as a way to uncover those same premises - 
which is just what re-simulation does in our toy example. In Section 5 we expand on this thought 
to present our positive view.   
5. What Simulation Lacks: Attribution and Warrant 
In the previous sections, simulation did not prove to be easily assimilated to observation or to 
inference. Simulation of an event in some domain, unlike observation of a similar event in the 
same domain, typically has a role in calibrating and making explicit our own background models. 
Learning through simulation did not meet our definition of learning through inference because a 
typical simulation works without the thinker understanding which of her beliefs led to the output.  
Drawing on these features, we’re now in a position to offer an account of what makes learning by 
simulation distinctive, and what this means for the epistemic function of simulation. In short, 
learning through simulation does not presuppose an answer to the following two questions: 
 Attribution Question: Which inputs or features of the process led to the output?12  
 Warrant Question: In virtue of what is the output justified? 
While uncertainty about the answers to these questions is characteristic of mental simulation, it 
                                               
11 As it happens, motor simulation provides a more reliable basis for reaching the correct answer  
to the water-pouring problem than pure visual/spatial simulation, but both lead to better 
performance than soliciting a verbal response without a prompt to engage in some form of 
simulation (Schwartz & Black, 1999). 
12 In some cases, uncertainty about the answer to the attribution question might concern how the 
output was generated rather than what went into generating it. For instance, you might be told that 
your simulation used exactly these three pieces of information, but if you lack an understanding 
of how those facts could lead to the output, this would not resolve your real uncertainty. However, 
at least in some paradigmatic examples, “what” uncertainty is more diagnostic than “how” 
uncertainty. 
may not be unique to simulation. However, we will argue that these forms of uncertainty partially 
differentiate learning through simulation from canonical cases of both observation and inference. 
Our paradigm cases of learning through inference, and indeed the definition of inference, require 
that the reasoner have at least partial answers to these questions. She must know (or believe, on a 
fallibilist conception), that premises P1...PN support her conclusion, and her knowledge of (or 
belief in) the conclusion must be based on this support. On a restrictive view of inference that 
requires explicit awareness of the relationship between the premises and the conclusion, inference 
presupposes attribution knowledge. And if this view requires explicit awareness of the inferential 
norms as governing norms, inference presupposes warrant knowledge.  
However, recall that our account of inference was less demanding when it comes to explicit 
knowledge; On our view, inference can be defined functionally or behaviorally. Yet even on this 
weaker view, inference requires not only being moved by some particular premises, but having a 
standing disposition to follow rules connecting the premises and conclusion. The fact that this 
disposition is to follow the rules rather than merely accord with them allows us to attribute implicit 
warrant knowledge, even to our maze-running rat.13 But we cannot do the same for our water-
pouring simulator. By re-simulating the output, only sporadically relying on simulation, or even 
expressing confusion about how her simulation worked, the simulator behaves (or is disposed to 
behave) as if she does not have attribution or warrant knowledge. In contrast, by flexibly applying 
inference across the requisite situations, responding to defeating conditions on a particular 
inferential rule, and so on, the person making an inference behaves (or is disposed to behave) as if 
she did have attribution and warrant knowledge. 
This “behaving as if” might seem like weak grounds to claim that she has or does not have 
knowledge of attribution and warrant, but the interlocutor who is pushing a thin, dispositional 
theory of inference should be more inclined to accept a correspondingly thin, dispositional 
ascription of knowledge.  
Of course, a thinker who learns something from inference may understand very little about the 
conclusion. For instance, a student who completes a logical proof successfully using a conditional 
proof may not understand that her conclusion could have been reached by using a proof by negation. 
                                               
13 In the non-human animal case, a rodent who simulates a path through a maze during sleep may 
repeat that simulation over and over again with small variations before she tries out the path in real 
life. The rodent who makes a kind of inductive inference may also try out many different paths 
before coming to a determinate plan of action. However, our second rat will try out different paths 
systematically, in ways that represent her application of extracted general principles: for instance, 
she might carry out a kind of tree-based planning that displays an implicit awareness of the 
structure of anticipated events. This is in contrast to a kind of simulation oriented toward 
uncovering that structure, which could by definition not be so systematic. Of course, it’s currently 
deeply controversial what repetitions of neural firings during sleep represent, if they represent 
anything at all. Our point here is that if replay during sleep is a kind of mental simulation, as 
Buzsaki et al. suggest, then we can distinguish the way the rodent treats these representations from 
the way the rodent would treat outputs of ‘inferential’ processes. And so even on the thin, 
dispositional notion of inference, simulation typically presupposes a further kind of uncertainty. 
But unlike the case of simulation, she understands that her conclusion follows from her proof, and 
why - even if she can say nothing more specific than “because it logically follows from these 
premises.”14  
A similar move can explain why the answers to these questions are available in typical cases of 
learning through observation. Here, we know that we are making observations of the world, and 
this knowledge is critical for normal observation. On some intellectualized theories of observation, 
observers always endorse a proposition about the reliability of their own observations, which will 
straightforwardly imply attribution, since classifying a learning experience as observation is 
making an attribution of the content to the environment, and will straightforwardly imply warrant, 
since reliability is a kind of warrant.   
But what about a less intellectualized theory of observation? Imagine that the correct 
epistemological view says that without any reflection, we have a strong default entitlement to rely 
on our perception, even absent any kind of demonstrable reason to do so (a position typically 
known as “perceptual dogmatism”). Even on this theory, we need to go along with our default 
entitlement to actually learn, so an observer who is uncertain about whether or not she is observing 
faces a problem. To learn through observation, she must go along with her perception and put aside 
the uncertainty. In asserting that the perceiver should go ahead and presume her perception comes 
from the external world even if she can’t provide evidence that it’s not actually an internally 
generated hallucination, she has attribution knowledge (or acts as though she does). In saying that 
the perceiver should presume her perception is reliable even if she can’t give any evidence about 
the reliability of her perceptual faculties, she has warrant knowledge (or acts as though she does). 
That is, even on theories of observation that require no reflection or internal justification, 
observation requires attribution and warrant knowledge -  it’s just that this form of knowledge is 
ascribed very liberally.  
6. What Simulation Offers: A Path to Self-Training 
We’ve argued that uncertainty regarding attribution and warrant are part of what makes learning 
through simulation distinctive. But it may seem as though this feature is simply an epistemic 
weakness. After all, answers to the two questions may be valuable in many contexts, and even 
critical for being fully justified in relying on simulation.  
On the contrary, we’ll argue that this weakness can sometimes be a strength. Learning through 
simulation does not presuppose certainty about attribution and warrant, and this has two 
epistemically interesting effects: in the short-term simulation can allow learners to benefit from 
mental processes that are largely opaque, and in the long run simulation is a critical part of learning 
about attribution and warrant, thereby rendering those very processes less opaque. This explains 
why simulation plays dual roles: a one-shot simulation can provide a particular answer, and 
simulation in the long-run provides understanding of our own internal models which enables 
                                               
14 To exclude these cases, the Attribution and Warrant Questions must be understood as applying 
to the particular token output of the learning process, not to the learning process more generally, 
or to the type output of the learning process. These other kinds of interpretative uncertainty are 
present in many of our cases, but are not distinctive to simulation. 
tuning and evaluation. We’ll start with the long-run case. 
Consider how, in the water-pouring case, a thinker might respond to her uncertainty about the 
scope and reliability of her motor model by re-simulating, as sketched earlier. To figure out how 
much a result depended on the initial setup, she might run the simulation again but this time 
imagining that the glasses were filled up very high or very low. This would help her learn that it 
doesn’t matter whether the water is above or below the midline. She might re-check her motor 
simulations against a visualization, or even experiment on or observe the motion of liquids in 
containers in the real world. Or she could reason about what part of the setup would have led to 
the conclusion and what part would have been irrelevant. These responses are not alternatives to 
simulation, but next steps that build on her initial simulation. Through this process, she will begin 
to learn which parts of her motor and visual models lead to which outputs, when each model is 
likely to fit the world and when it ought not be relied on, and other related facts: that is, she will 
resolve attribution and warrant uncertainty.   
This process of uncovering the workings of the model is central to prominent empirical theories 
of mental simulation. For instance, in the motor case, research finds that expertise with one sport 
can result in better pattern recognition in another sport. This isn’t because individual motor skills 
transfer from one domain to another (in general such transfer is weak), but rather because expertise 
involves a kind of meta-cognitive knowledge about the appropriate uses of simulation – the experts 
have learned something about attribution and warrant when it comes to the use of motor imagery 
for skill improvement.15 
In such cases, expertise in motor skill improves the outputs of  internal models, but it also renders 
an aspect of the model available for evaluation, which in turn provides new opportunities for 
training. Training requires holding up a part of the model for evaluation, and greater accessibility 
means that evaluation of the model and its output can draw on a wider body of evidence. Evaluation, 
of course, subsequently allows the model to be tuned and adjusted, and for its appropriate scope 
to be understood. And so over time, this iterative process resolves warrant and attribution 
uncertainty as the internal model is built and trained. To simplify somewhat, this is because 
attribution uncertainty is an accessibility problem, and warrant uncertainty is an evaluation 
                                               
15 Comparing motor transfer with cognitive transfer, Schmidt and Young (1987) summarize the 
state of the research: “When such measures are applied to experiments on motor transfer, the 
outcomes arc relatively consistent Motor transfer is generally very small” (pp59).  So one might 
expect that motor experts in one domain would not have any significant advantage in another 
related but distinct domain – and might even perform worse due to interference. Abernathy et al. 
(2005) found that to the contrary, experts in different sports performed significantly better than 
novices at pattern recognition and classification in a different sport from that of their expertise. 
Williams et al. (2006) compared expert and non-expert soccer players, finding that experts relied 
more on structural features where non-experts relied on superficial features. MacIntyre et al. (2014) 
theorize that these differences stem at least in part from a link between mental practice and 
metacognition: experts have enhanced abilities to imagine and simulate, and this is connected to a 
greater awareness of the appropriate use of simulation: “experts may simply possess greater meta-
cognitive knowledge of how to employ imagery effectively for skill improvement as compared to 
novices.” 
problem – and as we’ve seen, the two problems are tied together such that better accessibility 
makes better evaluation possible.  
We’ll now argue that unlike learning through simulation, learning through observation and 
learning through inference do not offer systematic ways of resolving warrant and attribution 
uncertainty. By “systematic” we intend to allow that sometimes, this uncertainty can be resolved 
by luck, or by brute external alteration such as a kind of re-programming, or even occasionally by 
a stroke of good reasoning or observation. But we hold that overall, neither observation nor 
inference are well-positioned for this role as compared with simulation. This argument will 
therefore presuppose that the thinker already has a need for simulation because of warrant and 
attribution uncertainty; we’ll take up the question of why a thinker would ever end up with this 
kind of uncertainty in Section 8. 
Consider a case discussed by Tal (2011). On his analysis, the use of simulation allowed physicists 
to confirm the Bose-Hubbard model in the following way. First, a series of observations were 
made concerning phase transitions, including one that seemed to fit with the Bose-Hubbard model 
(in Munich in 2001), and one that seemed not to fit with the model (in Zurich, 2004). After this, a 
third group of physicists ran a computer simulation that produced simulated predictions for what 
would be observed if the Bose-Hubbard model were true. The result of this simulation revealed 
that the second set of experiments from Zurich, which initially seemed to be at odds with the model, 
were actually the sort of result that we would expect to see on the Bose-Hubbard model. For our 
purposes, the important feature of this case is that the physicists already had the observations that 
would confirm their theory when they ran the simulation – but it was only after analyzing the 
simulation that they understood these observations as evidence in favor of the theory. Therefore, 
the epistemic function of the simulation could not have been filled by observation, since the 
observation had already occurred.  
Now, a perfect physicist might use impeccable inference to determine analytically the 
consequences of her theory. But the physicists studying the Bose-Hubbard model were presumably 
unable to do so; this is precisely the sense in which they were uncertain prior to the simulation. So 
just as with observation, inference cannot be a systematic solution to this problem. This is because 
physicists who could infer their way reliably from the theory to its various predicted observations 
would never be in this situation in the first place. Therefore, neither of the other learning methods 
will in general resolve warrant and attribution uncertainty.    
The preceding argument concerned the long-run use of simulation. In the one-shot case, our 
account suggests that thinkers can learn from the output of a single simulation, but this form of 
learning is fragile given the underlying uncertainty. One-shot reliability will be imperfect since 
warrant uncertainty prevents the thinker from being perfectly responsive to the scope and meaning 
of the output, unless by luck. In the one-shot water-pouring case, for example, when you began 
the simulation, you were either already justified in believing the output of the motor system or not. 
However, you did not yet believe the wide glass would spill first before carrying out the simulation. 
It would even be controversial to say that you implicitly believed it, since you would be unlikely 
to consistently behave as though it were the case, and your motor system may not even have 
represented this fact about the two glasses so much as other features of liquids that imply the wider 
glass will spill first.16 And so the simulation led you to believe the wide glass would spill first, and 
thereby to know it. Thus representational change associated with simulation enables reliance on 
one-shot simulation, but does not provide a new source of justification so much as enable access 
to a potential source to which the thinker is in some sense already connected. In contrast, in the 
long-run case, representational change to the model and its accessibility is an integral part of the 
thinker coming to have genuinely novel justification for her subsequent beliefs. 
Stochasticity in simulation also functions differently in the one-shot case than in the long-run case. 
While not all simulations are stochastic, most scientific simulations seem to be, and it is standard 
to model mental simulation as a kind of non-deterministic sampling (see Zhang et al. 2012, and 
Bramley et al., 2018, for two examples in different domains). Stochasticity looks like a liability in 
one-shot simulation, since the output may be an unlikely one that mischaracterizes the internal 
model and the target system. Rather, it’s only over the long-term, or with repeated one-shot 
simulations, that stochasticity emerges as a desirable feature of simulations, allowing the system 
to encode uncertainty while maintaining specificity.   
The combination of these two roles for simulation based on time-scale suggests an interesting 
consequence: because the long-run role changes the properties of the model over time, the one-
shot uses of simulation might depend on where they occur in the long-run process. In general, one-
shot learning will be more reliable later on in the process. 
We’re now in a position to see another benefit of long-run simulation related not to the process 
itself, or to its inputs or outputs, but to what triggers the use of simulation in the first place. 
Compare an expert simulator with a novice. The expert will be triggered to employ simulation 
more appropriately, and likely more often, than the novice; because her model makes more explicit 
and accurate predictions, the impetus to simulate will arise in contexts where her predictions are 
relevant, whereas the novice will have fewer and less explicit predictions that will relate to 
different circumstances precisely because they are less well calibrated. Of course, many uses of 
simulation may still be completely initiated by an external factor, such as a teacher asking you to 
solve a puzzle by imagining the pieces, or the authors of a paper asking you to consider the water-
pouring problem. But in many critical domains, successful simulation depends on simulating under 
the right conditions. And as the simulator becomes more and more knowledgeable, she will get 
closer and closer to meeting our definition of inference, at least in its weaker dispositional form. 
7. How Simulation Works: Changing accessibility conditions through representational 
extraction 
In Section 6, we suggested that simulations make information more accessible. In the long-run 
case, changes in accessibility enable enhanced evaluation and learning over time, whereas in the 
one-shot case, accessibility was not epistemically significant in terms of justification, but 
                                               
16 Of course, we can easily imagine a case where you do implicitly believe the output of the 
simulation even before you simulate, and then later come to explicitly believe it. In this case, you 
would not come to know by simulation since you already knew, but we might say that you now 
believe more firmly or understand better. Likewise, we’ve allowed for simulations that have only 
implicit representations as their output. How to treat these cases would depend on the theory of 
implicit knowledge.  
nonetheless played a role in explaining how you came to have knowledge of q. It might therefore 
be tempting to characterize learning through simulation as a process by which implicit knowledge 
becomes explicit knowledge, and center the epistemic function of simulation on this transition. We 
will suggest that this characterization is not quite right. 
The implicit/explicit characterization is compelling because it explains how knowledge is possible 
at all (it was there all along), and also what changes through learning (something formerly implicit 
becomes explicit). For instance, in the water-pouring problem, the answer was in some sense 
already encoded in the learner’s perceptual or motor system. On the other hand, one result of the 
simulation is that the answer is now encoded in a form that can be expressed in words, used as a 
premise in further reasoning, and so on.  
The idea that a mental simulation can render implicit knowledge explicit is reflected in claims 
about thought experimentation in both philosophy and psychology. For example, Mach (1897, 
1905) suggested that thought experiments reveal “instinctive knowledge.” Clement (2009) writes 
that mental simulations can “draw out implicit knowledge” that can then be described in linguistic 
form. We think this idea gets something right, but also faces serious limitations. 
First, outside a handful of specialized literatures within psychology, it’s unclear what it means for 
something to be implicit or explicit. Are these claims about the structure of mental representations? 
About the mechanisms by which they are accessed? And what is it that changes through learning? 
Ideally, an account of learning through simulation should support answers to such questions.  
Second, some cases of learning through simulation seem to involve transitions within the realm of 
the implicit, or within the realm of the explicit. For instance, in the rodent example provided by 
Buzsaki, an implicit representation about possible head directions could be made available to an 
implicit module encoding memory for past navigational trajectories. Within the realm of the 
explicit, the physics modeler’s computer simulation could result in a transfer of explicit general 
assumptions about bosons in a lattice into explicit predictions about what particular signals will be 
detected by a scanning device. A better way of describing this change in availability is in terms of 
a change in the accessibility conditions for some information, where this change occurs via 
representational extraction through simulation. Below we unpack these ideas.  
Following Lombrozo (forthcoming), we make the relatively uncontroversial assumption that 
“different mental representations are available to different mental processes.” With this 
assumption in place, we can see that the output of a mental simulation will be available to some 
processes, but not to others. For example, the output of a particular motor simulation might be 
available to guide an arm movement, but not to verbally report; the output of a visual simulation 
of the water-pouring problem, on the other hand, may well be available for verbal report, and also 
as a premise in further reasoning. The crucial observation is that a mental simulation will often 
generate a representation – the output – that makes information available to a system in a new way. 
Prior to the mental simulation, a simulator’s motor system may have encoded a regularity between 
glass width and pouring angle, but not in a form that was available for verbal report or further 
verbal reasoning.  
This approach goes beyond an implicit / explicit distinction in recognizing a much broader range 
of accessibility conditions for information.17 We can posit a range of mental processes, each of 
which imposes some constraints on what it will accept as “input.” A mental simulation, like 
inference, produces “new information” in only a limited sense; instead, what it offers is a change 
in accessibility conditions, and hence in how existing information can be deployed. The result is 
what we call “representational extraction,” which can occur in both one-shot and long-run cases. 
In a case of one-shot simulation, information that may be encoded only implicitly in the process 
by which a simulation operates can constrain the output of the simulation. As a result, downstream 
systems will benefit from this information indirectly – by virtue of access to the output, which has 
been shaped by the relevant information. 
Turning to the case of long-run simulation, we can see an additional way in which simulation can 
“extract” a new representation. As simulation is repeated and the simulator begins to resolve her 
uncertainty concerning attribution and warrant, she can come to represent the dependencies, 
relationships, and other content of the internal models that underwrote the simulations. Most often, 
this process will also involve inference. For example, she might infer a particular dependence 
relationship from repeated pairs of initial conditions and outputs, just as we described the water-
pourer as playing around with water levels to see how changes would affect the output. Even if the 
internal workings of the model started out fully opaque, this backwards inference would 
increasingly ground her knowledge of the relationships encoded in the model.   
Representational extraction explains the puzzle posed by the Hallucinated Replay example: how 
could less accurate simulated “observations” be more useful than more accurate genuine 
observations? The answer is that simulation, unlike observation, results in representational 
extraction – the simulated “observations” extract, or make available, consequences of the model 
that were previously only represented in a more limited way. Without extraction, self-training is 
necessarily limited – as we’ve argued, it is only because parts of the model are exposed to evidence 
that they can be improved. In Hallucinated Replay, the agent could “improve” parts of the model 
that could not ever be trained by experience, since they predicted what would happen after an 
impossible state of the world. But extracting even these steps has a use, since these impossible 
transitions are related to other parts of the model and partly determine higher-order generalizations.  
Representational extraction is by its nature a way of making a piece of one’s representation 
exposed to a wider range of one’s evidence, a process that has not merely intellectual value but 
                                               
17  Philosophers are increasingly recognizing that accessibility of information is a major 
determining factor in producing actions, guiding reasoning and every other cognitive activity: it’s 
not just what you believe that matters, but which beliefs you are disposed to access in a given 
context. Harman (1986) drew attention to relevance and access as central to changes in belief (see 
also Stalnaker (1991)) and more recently Elga and Rayo (ms.) provide a semantic framework for 
representing accessibility relationships. These theories essentially take on the question of how 
limitations in accessibility should be understood, and how it is rational to respond in light of these 
limitations. Our approach is consistent with these ideas, but considers a slightly different question: 
we are concerned not (only) with the conditions under which a belief is accessible for explicit 
report or reasoning, but more broadly in the conditions under which a representation (which need 
not be a belief) is accessible to a mental system (which need not be verbal report or reasoning). 
 
practical pay-off.  
8. What Kinds of Learners Need to Simulate? 
We have argued that observation and inference don’t make good substitutes for simulation. In 
doing so, we have described thinkers who have uncertainty about their own internal models that 
only simulation can address. However, this uncertainty need not characterize every thinker. So we 
are now in a position to ask: what kind of creature would need to simulate in the first place? Or, 
what kind of learning environment would make simulation necessary?  
Throughout this paper, we’ve contrasted simulation to inference and observation. This contrast 
reveals two conditions that must be met for simulation to be necessary (in the sense that it cannot 
be replaced by observation or inference): 
1. The thinker must be limited in the kind of information she has free access to. That is, she 
sometimes cannot perform a particular experiment or make a particular observation without 
paying a significant cost or incurring a significant risk. 
2. The thinker must have some representational opacity.  
Condition 1 makes it so that she cannot substitute experimentation for simulation, and Condition 
2 makes it so that she cannot substitute inference for simulation.  And our analysis of the distinctive 
uncertainty that rationalizes simulation allows us to see these conditions as following directly from 
the function of simulation. If the agent could experiment as much as she desires, contra Condition 
1, she could figure out exactly how reliable her various internal processes are. That is, she could 
resolve warrant uncertainty. And if the agent were totally transparent to herself, contra Condition 
2, she would be able to resolve any attribution uncertainty. Together, the two conditions make 
simulation a vital capacity.   
All of us live in environments with limited evidence, and thereby meet Condition 1. Even the most 
idealized agents are presumably still subject to this limitation – and in fact, even with abundant 
evidence, limitations in cognitive capacity might create trade-offs between collecting evidence and 
making plans. Momennejad et al. (2018) think of offline simulation as crucial for this reason: it 
allows the agent to save time and cognitive resources at the moment of decision. 
But why would a thinker have representations that are opaque to her? Or in other words, could 
there be a reason that some mental processes are at least initially a black box? One kind of opacity 
springs from modularity, even in weak forms. If the thinker is made up of specialized modules that 
each employ their own representational format, it might be costly to translate between them. 
Further, there might be no lossless means of translation. In either case, this would result in some 
content in one module being inaccessible to another module or cognitive process, as we have 
already suggested.18 
                                               
18 Opacity could arise even in agents who are only very weakly modular – for instance, a thinker 
who shifts between two styles of thought (depending on context) that broadly recruit the same 
resources. This thinker may not be able to access both ways of thinking in every context, and yet 
the capacity to simulate might allow her to jump between contexts by setting up a virtual version 
of another context.  
At this point, we can return to the question of the relationship between simulation in science and 
mental simulation.19 Our account appeals to epistemic features (warrant and attribution uncertainty) 
that can be applied to a thinker, a scientific community, or even to other kinds of group agents. 
Throughout the discussion, we’ve drawn attention to common features between simulation in these 
disparate contexts, such as the propensity to re-simulate. Although representational opacity might 
emerge for different reasons at individual and group levels,20 in both cases simulation can reduce 
opacity through representational extraction that changes accessibility conditions: information 
becomes available to other parts of the mind, or to the human operators of machine simulations. 
We therefore expect the core features of our account to apply to learning through simulation quite 
broadly. 
9. Conclusion 
This paper has addressed the question: how can we learn through simulation? After considering, 
and rejecting, models of learning through simulation that treat simulation as a kind of observation 
or a kind of inference, we have presented a theory on which simulation is distinct from either of 
these better-understood forms of learning. Simulation does not presuppose an understanding of 
how the output was generated (attribution) or how the process of generation should be relied on 
(warrant). However, simulation over time makes progress on resolving this uncertainty through 
representational extraction.   
Our account sheds light on our starting point: the idea that simulation is somewhat like observation 
and somewhat like inference. Simulation is somewhat like observation in that the thinker gets the 
output “from outside.” This is because simulation involves representational extraction, or the 
bringing in of information from one cognitive system or model to another. Simulation is somewhat 
like inference in extracting something from what we already have. Moreover, as we simulate more 
and more, and get more and more evidence from other sources, our internal model goes from a 
work-in-progress to, hypothetically, a complete product. Simulation aims at resolving attribution 
and warrant uncertainty, and in the limit when the uncertainty is fully resolved, simulation 
becomes a fully transparent way to process information through a fully trained internal model. In 
other words, simulation becomes inference.  
 
                                               
19 See Bratman (2013) or Gilbert (2000) for a related discussion. 
20 Representational opacity will potentially be instantiated differently across individual and group 
agents. For instance, in the Bose-Hubbard case, representational opacity might result from the fact 
that the computer model contained latent information about the likelihood of various observations 
based on the theory – and this information was opaque to the scientists debating the various 
theories. But we might also consider the information to be represented in the Bose-Hubbard theory 
itself, rather than the computer model. Addressing this question, and other related issues, would 
require a theory of the group thinker, or the group of thinkers, that is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
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